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BRATTv. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 16, 1984, in Bratt v. International Business Machines,l 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts clarified the right of em­
ployers to use personal information about their employees. Address­
ing libel and invasion of privacy claims, the court defined the 
standards employers must follow when disclosing private employee 
information.2 
The court held that employers have a conditional privilege3 to 
disclose defamatory facts about an employee, if the disclosure reason­
ably serves a legitimate business interest in the employee's job compe­
tence.4 In addition, the court ruled that employers can be held liable 
for abusing the privilege but only upon a minimum showing of reck­
lessness, whether or not the disclosed information was medical.5 The 
court also held that conditional privileges do not apply to claims 
brought under the Massachusetts right to privacy statute.6 Rather, in 
invasion of privacy actions against an employer, an interest balancing 
test will be applied:7 an employer's legitimate business interest in us­
ing private information about an employee must outweigh the intru­
sion on the employee's privacy.8 The same test applies when medical 
information is involved.9 
The supreme judicial court addressed these issues in response to 
seven questions certified to it from the United States Court of Appeals 
1. 392 Mass. 508,467 N.E.2d 126 (1984). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 512-13, 467 N.E.2d at 131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 593 
and scope note (1977). 
4. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 509, 512-13,467 N.E.2d at 129, 130-31. 
5. Id. at 509, 517,457 N.E.2d at 129, 133. 
6. Id. at 510,519-20,467 N.E.2d at 129, 135. The right of privacy statute states: "A 
person shall have a right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his 
privacy. The superior court shall have jurisdiction in equity to enforce such right and in 
connection therewith to award damages." MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 214, § IB (West 
Supp. 1984). 
7. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 510, 520-21,467 N.E.2d at 129, 135-36. 
8. Id. at 509-10, 520-22,467 N.E.2d at 129, 135-36. 
9. Id. at 522, 467 N.E.2d at 136. 
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for the First Circuit. 10 The action underlying this decision originated 
in the Superior Court for Middlesex County, Massachusetts, but was 
removed to the United States District Court for the District of Massa­
chusetts on the defendant's diversity motion. I I 
II. THE FACTS 
The plaintiff, Robert Bratt, was employed by International Busi­
ness Machines Corporation (IBM) for approximately eight years prior 
to the events that generated this action.12 During that period, Bratt 
occasionally complained to IBM's management13 about the low qual­
ity of his evaluations, the sparcity of his promotions and raises, and 
IBM's failure to implement his suggestions for improving the com­
pany.14 After one fruitless grievance meeting with IBM's personnel 
director, Bratt mentioned to his supervisor that he had been suffering 
from headaches, nervousness, and insomnia. IS In response, his super­
visor recommended a check-up with the corporation's physician. 16 
After the doctor examined Bratt, he phoned Bratt's supervisor and 
reported that Bratt was "paranoid" and should see a psychiatrist.l7 
10. Id. at 508-09, 467 N.E.2d at 128. The certifed questions were: 
1. "In the case of a libel claim, when defendant has a conditional privilege, does loss of 
that privilege through 'unnecessary, unreasonable or excessive publication,' ... require 
more than ordinary negligence?" Id. at 512 n.7, 467 N.E.2d at 130 n.7 (citations omitted). 
2. "If so, does abuse of the privilege through such publication result from something less 
than recklessness?" Id. 
3. "Is the standard for abuse through excessive publication the same when the defamatory 
matter published is medical information?" Id. at 516 n.12, 467 N.E.2d at 132 n.12. 
4. "Can disclosure of private facts about an employee among other employees of a corpo­
ration constitute sufficient publication to infringe the employee's right of privacy?" Id. at 
517 n.14, 467 N.E.2d at 133 n.14. 
5. "Is there a conditional privilege for legitimate business communications under the 
Massachusetts right of privacy statute?" Id. at 519 n.16, 467 N.E.2d at 134 n.16. 
6. "If so, what are the standards for abuse of that privilege?" Id. 
7. "Are the same privilege and standard for abuse applicable in the case of medical infor­
mation?" Id. at 521 n.20, 467 N.E.2d at 136 n.20. See MASS. SUP. JUD. Cr. R. 1:03. 
11. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 509, 467 N.E.2d at 128. 
12. Id. at 510, 467 N.E.2d at 129. 
13. IBM maintained an "open door" policy grievance system whereby employees 
could air their complaints directly to higher management when their immediate superiors 
did not settle their problems satisfactorily. Id. at 510 & n.6, 467 N.E.2d at 129 & n.6. 
14. Id. at 510-11, 467 N.E.2d at 129-30. The court failed to discuss the nature of 
Bratt's suggestions. The personnel director, however, told him that they simply were not 
implemented, and that, in any event, he should not be concerned with achieving any per­
sonal recognition for making suggestions, as that was "part of his job." Id. at 511, 467 
N.E.2d at 130. 
15. Id. at 511, 467 N.E.2d at 130. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
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Bratt's supervisor relayed that opinion through another supervisor to 
IBM's personnel director. IS 
After IBM denied another of Bratt's grievances, his supervisor 
noted Bratt's reaction as "distraught and crying."19 The supervisor 
informed the personnel director of Bratt's behavior and the personnel 
director in turn distributed a memorandum to at least two other man­
agerial persons, complete with his personal impression that Bratt had 
mental problems extending beyond IBM.20 Meanwhile, Bratt's super­
visor made an appointment for him with a psychiatrist. The personnel 
director asked the medical director to confer with the psychiatrist to 
determine Bratt's employment competency.21 Bratt's suit claimed that 
the personnel director's memorandum libeled him, and that disclosure 
of his grievances and medical evaluations to inappropriate personnel 
violated his statutory right of privacy.22 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. 	 The Employer's Conditional Privilege to Publish Defamatory 
Information 
Before the Bratt decision, the supreme judicial court had recog­
nized the existence of a privilege to publish defamatory information.23 
The privilege applied, however, only under the condition that publica­
tion be reasonably necessary for a legitimate business interest.24 The 
Bratt court relied upon Galvin v. New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad for its discussion of the nature of conditional privileges.25 In 
Galvin, the court had explained that conditional privileges could be 
18. Id. at 511,467 N.E.2d at 130. 
19. Id. 
20. 	 /d. 
21. 	 Id. at 511-12,467 N.E.2d at 130. 
22. 	 Id. at 512, 467 N.E.2d at 130. See supra note 6. 
23. See Galvin v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 341 Mass. 293, 168 N.E.2d 262 
(1960). Accord, Underwood v. Digital Equip. Corp., 576 F. Supp. 213, 217 (D. Mass. 
1983). 
24. Id. at 296-97, 168 N.E.2d at 265-66. See McCone v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel., 393 
Mass. 231, 235-36, 471 N.E.2d 47,50-51 (1984) (same privilege applied to employee evalu­
ations); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 594 (1977). The law recognizes many types 
of conditional privileges. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Tobin, 326 Mass. 185, 190-91, 93 N.E.2d 
524, 528 (1950) ("where the publisher and the recipient have a common interest and the 
communication is of a kind reasonably calculated to protect or further it." (quoting W. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 837 (1941»; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §§ 595-598A (1977) (conditional privileges also exist for certain personal interests, 
common interests, public interests, family relationships, and state officers). See generally 
37 MASS. PRAC., Tort Law 143-45 (1979). 
25. 	 341 Mass. 293, 168 N.E.2d 262 (1960). 
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abused, and thereby forfeited, "by an unnecessary, unreasonable or ex­
cessive publication of the defamatory matter,"26 such as loud and re­
peated pubic accusations in the presence of a growing crowd of 
onlookers.27 The court, however, had not fully defined the standard by 
which such abuse had to be proved, although it stated that "actual 
malice" was not required. 28 Nonetheless, the Bratt court looked to 
Galvin for guidance, inasmuch as it seemed "to favor recklessness or 
'malice in fact' as the standard. "29 
In determining what should be the minimum standard for abuse, 
the Bratt court looked to Massachusetts case law and the RESTATE­
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. 3o The court relied upon Retailers Com­
mercial Agency, Inc., Petitioners,3' in which it had held that "[m]alice 
in uttering false statements may consist either in a direct intention to 
injure another, or in a reckless disregard of his rights and of the conse­
quences that may result to him."32 The supreme judicial court has 
also found knowledge of falsity,33 lack of reason to believe the truth,34 
or reckless disregard for the truth35 of a publication to constitute 
abuse of a conditional privilege. These holdings, combined with the 
Restatement's annunciation of the policy reasons behind conditional 
privileges,36 led the court to conclude that nothing less than reckless­
26. Id. at 297-98, 168 N.E.2d at 266. 
27. Id. In Galvin, several railroad policemen confronted a fellow officer with loud 
accusations of theft. The incident occurred on a street comer, and attracted a crowd of 
fifty or sixty. Id. at 294-95, 168 N.E.2d at 264-65. 
28. Id. at 297, 168 N.E.2d at 265-66. Earlier cases established that actual malice or 
"malice in fact" would constitute abuse of a conditional privilege. See Doane v. Grew, 220 
Mass. 171, 176, 107 N.E. 620, 621-22 (1915). 
29. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 513, 467 N.E.2d at 131 (referring to the statement in Galvin: 
"We think that the time has now come to recognize that there can be an abuse of a condi­
tional privilege by conduct which cannot fairly be classified as express or actual malice." 
Galvin v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 341 Mass. 293, 298, 168 N.E.2d 262, 266 (1960». 
See 37 MASS. PRAC., Tort Law 157 (1979). 
30. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 514-15, 467 N.E.2d at 131-32. 
31. 342 Mass. 515, 174 N.E.2d 376 (1961). 
32. Id. at 521, 174 N.E.2d at 380 (quoting Gott v. Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235, 239 
(1877». 
33. Tosti v. Ayik, 386 Mass. 721, 726, 437 N.E.2d 1062, 1065 (1982). 
34. Sheehan v. Tobin, 326 Mass. 185, 192,93 N.E.2d 524, 529 (1950) (citing Atwill 
v. Mackintosh, 120 Mass. 177, 183 (1876». 
35. Tosti v. Ayik, 386 Mass. 721, 726,437 N.E.2d 1062, 1065 (1982). Accord Ezekiel 
v. Jones Motor Co., 374 Mass. 382, 390, 372 N.E.2d 1281, 1287 (1978). 
36. Policy considerations require an unrestricted flow of certain types of information 
to facilitate and maintain our social and economic structure. In some cases, the threat of 
defamation liability might impair communication in situations in which society wishes to 
encourage free communications. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Vol. 3 at 258 (1977). 
See Bratt, 393 Mass. at 515 n.l1, 467 N.E.2d at 132 n.11; 37 MASS. PRACT., Tort Law 143 
(1979). See also DiSilva v. Polaroid Corp., No. 83-W631, slip op. (Mass. App. Div. Jan. 4, 
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ness could establish abuse of a conditional privilege. 37 
At the time the court considered the Bratt suit, the question of 
whether medical information should be treated similarly to other de­
famatory information, for the purposes of conditional privileges, had 
not yet been determined in Massachusetts. The Bratt court found that 
it should,38 recognizing that employers "have a legitimate need. . . to 
determine whether or not their employees are professionally, physi­
cally and psychologically capable of performing their duties."39 Any 
defamatory information disclosed during the process of making such a 
determination, therefore, is conditionally privileged and the reckless­
ness minimum standard obtains.4O 
B. The Employee's Right to Privacy 
Separate from his common law libel claim, Bratt raised an inva­
sion of privacy claim under the Massachusetts right of privacy stat­
ute.41 Earlier, the supreme judicial court had interpreted the statute as 
"proscrib[ing] the required disclosure of facts about an individual that 
are of a highly personal or intimate nature when there exists no legiti­
mate countervailing interest."42 The court had not previously decided, 
1985) (civil rights laws may require employers to investigate complaints of discrimination, 
thereby necessitating by law the use of potentially defamatory information concerning the 
alleged offender). 
37. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 515-16, 467 N.E.2d at 132. Any standard less than reckless­
ness, such as negligence, would defeat the very purpose of the conditional privilege. See 
supra note 36. 
38. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 516-17, 467 N.E.2d at 132-33. See Hoesl v. United States, 
451 F. Supp. 1170, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Leonard v. Wilson, 150 Fla. 503, 505, 8 So. 2d 
12, 13 (1942); Cochran v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 72 Ga. App. 458, 461, 34 S.E.2d 296, 298 
(1945). 
39. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 516, 467 N.E.2d at 133 (quoting Hoesl v. United States, 451 
F. Supp. 1170, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 1978». While the Bratt court relied heavily upon Hoes! for 
this principle, it did not go so far as to agree with the Hoes! court that the employer has a 
duty to make such determinations of fitness. Hoes!, 451 F. Supp. at 1176. See infra note 61 
and accompanying text. 
40. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 517, 467 N.E.2d at 133. Interestingly, the court discussed 
two principles peculiarly applicable to the facts of Bratt: first, many courts would not find 
an "oblique or hyperbolic" imputation of mental disorder defamatory; and second, a clear 
statement to an employer that an employee had a specific mental condition that made him 
incompetent was "defamatory on its face." Id. at 516 n.13, 467 N.E.2d at 133 n.13 (quot­
ing Hoesl v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1170, 1172-73 (N.D. Cal. 1978». Other than 
stating that it agreed with these principles, the court offered no explanation for positing 
them. One may speculate, however, that the court meant them as helpful, albeit unsolic­
ited, suggestions to the federal court for the proper disposition of the case. 
41. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 517-19, 467 N.E.2d at 133-34. See supra note 6. 
42. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 518, 467 N.E.2d at 133-34. The Massachusetts legislature 
apparently intended to give the courts complete control over the development of privacy 
law, an area with great potential for growth in proportion to the expansion of modern 
technology. The broad wording of the statute gives the judiciary considerable room in 
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however, whether intracorporate communication constitutes sufficient 
publication to violate a plaintiff's statutory right of privacy.43 Because 
no definite precedent existed, the court sought guidance from analo~ 
gous cases. One case had held that the right of privacy statute prohib­
ited employers from requesting "unreasonably intrusive, personal 
information" from their employees by intracorporate questionnaire.44 
In another case, transmittal of defamatory material to geographically 
separate divisions of the same company had constituted publication 
for the purposes of a libel action.45 Reasoning from these cases, the 
court concluded that an employer's disclosure of private information 
to the employee's fellow workers constituted sufficient pUblication 
under the statute.46 
Unlike libel actions, however, "Massachusetts case law does not 
recognize a conditional privilege, as such, for legitimate business com­
munications under the right of privacy statute."47 Since no condi­
tional privilege exists, no need arises for a standard of abuse.48 
Nevertheless, the court did not bar the employer's right to use per-
which to work. See supra note 6. See Note, The Massachusetts Right of Privacy Statute: 
Decoy or Ugly Duckling?, 9 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1248, 1252-54 (1975). 
43. The court noted that the phrasing of the question assumed that publication was 
necessary for an invasion of privacy. While warning that such an assumption might not be 
valid, the court answered the question in the context given. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 517 n.14, 
467 N.E.2d at 133 n.14. 
44. Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 307-08, 431 N.E.2d 908, 912 (1982) 
(questionnaire submitted to regional sales personnel aimed at uncovering reason for poor 
sales). Cf Broderick v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 368 Mass. 33,44, 330 N.E.2d 199, 206 
(1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1048 (1976) (police commissioner's questionnaire, regarding 
certain officers' misconduct at a police social event, did not infringe on officers' right of 
privacy because activities were done in public and, a fortiori, were not private). 
45. Riceman v. Union Indemnity Co., 278 Mass. 149, 151-52, 179 N.E. 629, 630 
(1932) (letter accusing plaintiff of bootlegging was mailed in Boston to other divisions of 
insurance company in New York and Kansas City). 
46. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 519, 467 N.E.2d at 134. The court noted that the Massachu­
setts concept of the tort of invasion of privacy differs from the Restatement version. The 
latter requires communication of private information to the public at large, whereas the 
former requires mere disclosure of personal facts. Id. at 519 n.15, 467 N.E.2d at 134 n.15; 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
47. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 519-20, 467 N.E.2d at 135. The court cited no authorities, 
and the author could not find any, to support this bald assertion. Perhaps the court was 
drawing a logical conclusion, i.e., since no conditional privilege can coexist with a reasona­
bleness balancing test, then no such conditional privilege exists. See infra text accompany­
ing note 49. 
Although making such a clear-cut conclusion obviously answered the First Circuit's 
fifth question in the negative, the court proceeded to explain what standard stood in place 
of the conditional privilege, thereby qualifying its answer. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 521 & n.20, 
467 N.E.2d at 136 & n.20. See supra note 10. 
48. The court thus declined to answer the sixth certified question. Bratt, 392 Mass. 
at 521, 467 N.E.2d at 136. See supra note 10. 
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sonal information about its employees. "[B]ecause [the right to pri­
vacy statute] only proscribes unreasonable interference with a person's 
privacy, legitimate countervailing business interests in certain situa­
tions may render the disclosure of personal information reasonable 
and not actionable under the statute."49 Hence, the test to be applied 
in ascertaining whether an interference is unreasonable requires a bal­
ancing between "the seriousness of the intrusion on the employee's 
privacy" and "the employer's legitimate interest in determining the 
employees' effectiveness in their jobs."50 Courts have used essentially 
the same balancing test to determine priority between conflicting legal 
rights in most situations. 5I 
When medical information is involved, however, the presence of 
an additional policy consideration alters the proportional weight of the 
interests involved under the balancing test. 52 The Bratt court ac­
knowledged that Massachusetts does not recognize a doctor-patient 
evidentiary privilege. 53 In fact, the supreme judicial court has tended 
to disfavor "claims of privilege" that seek to inhibit judicial explora­
tion of the truth. 54 Nonetheless, the Bratt court recognized that there 
is a legitimate "public interest in preserving the confidentiality55 of a 
49. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 520, 467 N.E.2d at 135. The court dismissed the remarkable 
similarity between its description of when an invasion of privacy might be reasonable and 
when a conditional privilege for business interests might exist by admitting that the stan­
dard "may, in some instances, be the same," but claiming to "prefer to adhere to the lan­
guage of our cases." Id. at 521 n.19, 467 N.E.2d at 136 n.19. 
Notably, the Bratt court consistently ignored the words "substantial or serious," 
which appear in the simply worded statute. See supra note 6. The court also failed to 
address the disjunctive grammatical structure of the sentence in which those words appear, 
i.e., "unreasonable, substantial or serious interference" (emphasis added). The grammar 
implies three types of interferences with privacy, whereas the court discussed the statute as 
though it encompassed only one. 
50. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 520, 467 N.E.2d at 135. See Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 
Mass. 300, 308, 431 N.E.2d 908, 913 (1982). 
51. See, e.g., Hastings & Sons Publishing Co. v. Treasurer of Lynn, 397 Mass. 812, 
817-18, 375 N.E.2d 299, 303-04 (1978) (municipal employees' privacy interest in payroll 
records falls to taxpayers' superior interest in knowing the salaries); Harrison v. Humble 
Oil & Refining Co., 264 F. Supp. 89, 92 (D.S.C. 1967) (debtor/employee's privacy interest 
falls to creditor/third party's superior legitimate business interest in seeking payment from 
debtor's employer by disclosing the debt to him). 
52. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 523, 467 N.E.2d at 137. 
53. Id. at 522 n.22, 467 N.E.2d at 136 n.22. See Kramer v. John Hancock Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 336 Mass. 465, 467, 146 N.E.2d 357, 359 (1957). 
54. Cronin v. Strayer, 392 Mass. 525, 532-33,467 N.E.2d 143, 148 (1984). See P.J. 
LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 174 (5th ed. 1981). 
55. In the context of the statutorily established psychotherapist-patient evidentiary 
privilege, see infra note 56, the proposed Massachusetts Rule of Evidence define a confiden­
tial communication as one "not intended to be disclosed to third persons, except persons 
present to further the interest of the patient in consultation, examination, or interview, 
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physician-patient relationship."56 This public interest assumes that a 
patient ought to feel free to tell his doctor all information necessary for 
proper treatment, secure that the information will go no farther than 
the doctor's office. 57 
Because of the public policy concern, the court would generally 
allow disclosure of confidential medical information only "under. . . 
compelling circumstances, . . . to a person with a legitimate interest 
in the patient's health."58 The court noted, however, that a difference 
exists between the ordinary confidences of a patient to his private phy­
sician and those of an employee to his employer's company doctor. 59 
In the latter case, traditional notions of the doctor-patient relationship 
do not apply.60 Because the employer pays the company doctor for 
the specific purpose of evaluating the employee's fitness to work, the 
physician's primary duty flows not to the patient but to the em­
ployer.61 The employer's interest in aspects of the employee's health 
persons reasonably necessary for transmission of the communication, or persons who are 
participating in the diagnosis and treatment. ..." MASS. R. EVID. 503(a)(3) (Proposed 
Official Draft 1980), reprinted in, 8 MASS. LAW. WEEK. 1231 (September 1, 1980). See 
Commonwealth v. Clemons, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 580, 583 n.2, 427 N.E.2d 761, 764 n.2 
(1981); Bratt, 392 Mass. at 523 n.23, 467 N.E.2d at 137 n.23. 
56. Id. at 523, 467 N.E.2d at 137. See Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 336, 181 A.2d 
345, 349 (1962); Ryan v. Bd. of Reg. in Med., 388 Mass. 1013, 1013-14,447 N.E.2d 662, 
663 (1983). While no statutory rule in Massachusetts protects a doctor-patient evidentiary 
privilege, the court acknowledged that the legislature "implicitly" demonstrated a concern 
for a confidential relationship between them by several related statutes. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 
522-23 n.22, 467 N.E.2d at 136 n.22. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12G (West 
1983) (pertaining to non-liability of physicians for release of medical information required 
in the public interest); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. lll, § 70 (West 1983) (allowing in­
spection of hospital records upon judicial order or proper authorization); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. Ill, § 70E (West 1983 & Supp. 1984) (confidentiality of hospital records); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. Ill, §§ 1l0B, 202, & ch. lIID, § 6 (West 1983) (records of 
fetal mortality and certain diseases are confidential); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, 
§ 12F (West 1983) ("all information and records kept in connection with the medical or 
dental care of a minor. . . shall be confidential between the minor and the physician or 
dentist"). Note that MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20B (West Supp. 1984), created a 
statutory privilege between psychotherapists and their patients, but that the supreme judi­
cial court thought it to be inapplicable to the facts of Bratt. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 522 n.22, 
467 N.E.2d at 137 n.22. See Hannaway v. Cole, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 847, 848, 311 N.E.2d 
924, 925 (1974) (rescript opinion). 
57. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 522-23, 467 N.E.2d at 136-37. See Hague v. Williams, 37 
N.J. 328, 336,181 A.2d 345, 349 (1962). "A personal relationship of trust and confidence 
must exist between a physician and his patient." Levy v. Bd. of Reg. & Discipline in Med., 
378 Mass. 519, 528, 392 N.E.2d 1036, 1041 (1979). 
58. Bratt, 392 at 523, 467 N.E.2d at 137 (quoting Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 
336, 181 A.2d 349 (1962). 
59. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 522 n.21, 467 N.E.2d at 136 n.21. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. See Jones v. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co., 118 Minn. 217, 219,136 N.W. 741 
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that bear on his job competency,62 then, would seem to outweigh com­
pletely the employee's privacy in virtually anything he might tell the 
company doctor. 63 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The significance of the Bratt decision rests on several bases. By 
assigning a reckless standard to abuse of conditional privileges, the 
court has set a fairly clear outer boundary for employers. The right to 
privacy balancing test established in Bratt, however, is unpredictable 
in that it requires a case-by-case analysis. Employers may, nonethe­
less, appreciate both aspects of the decision because the court has rein­
forced the recognition that employers need a certain degree of freedom 
in dealing with employee information, particularly medical informa­
tion affecting job competency, in order to manage their businesses 
effectively. 
Employees, on the other hand, face a diminished respect for the 
sanctity of personal information. They make take solace, however, in 
two aspects of the decision. First, the Bratt court did not grant em­
ployers unrestrained freedom to malign their employees. There are 
reasonable limits. Second, the court recognized the right of an em­
ployee to sue under the right to privacy statute for intracorporate mis­
use of personal information. In so doing, the court gave employees a 
method of protecting what right to privacy they have retained. 
It is difficult to determine how the supreme judicial court will 
apply the new standards in future cases. One fact is clear, however: 
the court attempted to remain neutral in the employer/employee con­
flict. While recognizing that both sides possess legitimate interests in 
private information, the court gave neither an unfair advantage. 
Howard A. Nunes 
(1912) (applying principle of respondeat superior to the company doctor and the company); 
and Hoesl v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1170, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (if the physician 
"downplays or even fails to mention a deficiency affecting [work] fitness, the employer's 
legitimate interest . . . is frustrated"). 
62. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
63. The doctor, of course, continues to owe the employee a duty of reasonable care 
and skill according to the standards of the medical profession. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 522 
n.21, 467 N.E.2d at 136 n.21. 
